This article analyzes Latin American politics in the 1940s with reference to two different explanatory perspectives as they bear on labor politics and regime change. The first focuses on the impact of international historical conjunctures, the second on internal trajectories and a path dependent model of change. The analysis reveals that, although international events left a strong imprint, they did not determine or deflect the unfolding of internal trajectories; indeed, internal dynamics seemed to be a stronger causal factor. However, international factors did help explain the distinctive coloration of the internal patterns, filling in some of the details and helping to account for the timing and intensity of the steps as they unfolded in each country.
transformation, more specifically the common need at some point in the process of economic growth to regularize labor-capital relations and to integrate the working class into the political system. It therefore focuses on an internally generated agenda, but one that is similar in country after country.
An international perspective may focus on different types of causes. One is diffusion or contagion of models or ideas from abroad: for instance, the international appeal of fascism, democracy, and communism. A second is common, repeated, or parallel causation in a number of countries: for example, American and Soviet foreign policy toward a number of Latin American countries. A third entails features of the international system that present opportunities for or constraints on the behavior of individual countries. This refers to the most general sort of common external cause, one that affects not just a subset of cases, as in the other types, but potentially has an impact on countries throughout the world system. For the present purpose of examining the 1940s in Latin America, what is considered here is the establishment of the postwar order: a bipolar international system, world hegemonic leadership of a hemispheric power, the salience of the Cold War with its competing ideologies, and the dominance of a world capitalist order characterized by a Keynesian compromise between labor and capital.
These two perspectives are in some sense mirror images of each other as each focuses on one set of causal factors (domestic or international) but recognizes the importance of rounding out the explanation with the other. Neither one would assume or advance a position of monocausality, and it is here, of course, that there is room to explore the issue of ways to combine the two perspectives as something other than rival hypotheses.
A further word may be added about this point. Collier and Collier quite explicitly reject monocausal claims. They trace the unfolding consequences of a particular historic transition but at the same time insist on two points. First, common causes do not produce similar political "regimes" but rather common component features of those larger regimes; that is, one can not conclude from these common features that in some more aggregate or global sense politics in these cases are simply similar. Second, though similar outcomes can be identified, they are not identical, for many factors will contribute to the particular shape of the outcome in any given instance. Therefore, cases within any particular pattern will exhibit substantial variation, though a general resemblance will distinguish them from other patterns.
In a similar fashion, there is no reason why an explanatory framework that focuses on the impact of international events should be monocausal in nature. Analysts in this tradition, like Bethell and Roxborough, are also explicit on this point, noting the importance of the interplay between domestic and international factors.9 What one perspective pursues systematically, the other also considers, but in a more supplementary, ad hoc manner.
We have, then, two quite different frameworks of analysis and two quite different sets of causal factors. One explores the possibility that some very important international forces powerfully influenced patterns of change in Latin America in the 1940s. The other emphasizes the importance of internal factors and the unfolding of internal trajectories of change over time. It will be argued here that these are not "rival" hypotheses, each of which has the potential to make the other spurious, so much as complementary explanations which can be usefully combined. Before assessing the nature of this complementarity, let us begin by treating each one separately.
The International Conjuncture of the 1940s
From the perspective of the international historical conjuncture of the 1940s, one might expect that external events would be reflected across a broad range of political and economic outcomes in Latin America. With respect to the subset of outcomes that concern us here, two separate but related dimensions might be distinguished. The first refers to coalitions and patterns of political and class collaboration or conflict. More specifically, we might consider whether or not labor unions and left parties were collaborating with other political and economic actors and the degree to which they were engaging in strikes and other forms of protest and confrontation. The second refers to regime traits, particularly democratization, political opening and closing, and reformist initiatives. More specifically at issue are the advance or retreat of an unrestricted competitive electoral arena, the legalization or banning of Communist parties, the expansion or contraction of labor rights, government support of or hostility to union organization, mobilization, and protest, and a change in policymaking toward greater or lesser benefit to the lower classes.
One might expect a number of external events to have an impact on these outcomes. The most important of these are presented in Table 1 . Concerning the first dimension of anticipated change-patterns of political and class collaboration-an obvious hypothesis would point to the causal role of the Comintern's popular front policy, first adopted in the mid 1930s. This policy was abandoned following the German-Soviet pact of 1939. With the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, however, the popular front policy was renewed in a more extreme form which advocated the formation of broad antifascist alliances, including cooperation with bourgeois parties, antifascist governments, and noncommunist groups within the labor movement. It advocated class collaboration, moderation of labor demands, and, at its most extreme, the dissolution of the Communist party and no-strike pledges for the duration of the war. In 1943 the Comintern was disbanded in a move that represented a dissolution of the international revolutionary alliance in favor of an antifascist alliance. Because Communist parties were influential in labor movements throughout Latin America, we would expect to see reverberations of Comintern policy throughout the region.
The spirit of multiclass solidarity and the advocacy of a reordered coalition to oppose fascism were not limited to the Communists. Equally evident, but often given less attention, is the parallel sentiment among the western democracies. The advanced capitalist countries-particularly the United States-exerted a corresponding influence on capitalist classes and political organizations in Latin America. The same year that the German invasion brought the Soviet Union into the war, the Japanese attack on Pearl One might expect that at least by the beginning of 1942 this change in U.S. attitude would be reflected in the recognition among a wide variety of groups in Latin America that the struggle against fascism was of paramount importance. International influences created a context in which noncommunist factions within the labor movement may have also been under pressure to pursue a more moderate course during the war effort, and Latin American governments and bourgeois parties may have been receptive to the Communist policy of collaboration.
The end of the war in 1945 brought an end to the rationale for political and class collaboration. European alliances were quickly reordered with the onset and deepening of the Cold War. To the extent these changes were reflected within Latin American countries, one might further postulate the reemergence of a postponed reformist or radical political agenda, ideological polarization, and a renewal of class conflict and labor protest.
The second dimension has to do with democratization and with political openings and closings. Here, the widely held hypothesis concerning the impact of international forces is that the approaching and then actual victory of the allies was seen throughout the world as ushering in a democratic era. The triumph of democracy over fascism in Europe led to a diffusion of democratic and reformist values throughout the world, a process which was reinforced by the U.N. charter. It ushered in a period marked by antiimperialist struggles and the onset of decolonization in other parts of the Third World. The hypothesis, then, is that the spread of democracy also extended to Latin America.
In addition to diffusion, direct pressure was exerted by the United States for political liberalization and democratization. This effort began as early as 1943 and was sustained throughout 1944. By 1945 and the beginning of Cold War hostilities over the issue of democracy in eastern Europe, "it became even more imperative that the allies of the United States in Latin America were seen to be democratic."'2 Starting in about 1944, then, one might predict a pattern of democratization and political opening in Latin America. In addition, one might expect a period of reformist initiatives, both because popular demands could be expressed in the more open structures and because in terms of policymaking the model of social democracy, the welfare state, and a Keynesian class compromise was held up by the United States and Europe.
Though reformist democracy was sustained in the industrialized West, it might be hypothesized that it would not be sustained in On the other hand, a coincidental internal logic among the phases potentially reinforces this external logic. To the extent that the external causes make themselves felt within any Latin American country, the particular outcome of each phase itself sets up a dynamic that could potentially lead to the next phase. For instance, the first phase of class collaboration could encourage a democratic opening by making it seem less threatening. This second phase, a democratic opening, could provide space for greater labor protest and militancy, which also comes into the analysis as an outcome of the postwar abandonment of the popular front policy of international communism. This third phase of greater labor protest and class conflict itself could produce a domestic reaction in the direction of closing the political arena, quite aside from the international influence of Cold War antagonisms. Thus, as we proceed with the analysis, it might be borne in mind that it is difficult to sort out these different logics, though the impact of international events would suggest a particular and more simultaneous timing across countries that could not otherwise be accounted for.
To what extent, then, did these hypothesized phases actually occur in the four Latin American countries which concern us here? This pattern was particularly evident in Brazil and Mexico. In the former, the period corresponded to the opening years of the Dutra government, which saw an intensification of the repoliticization of the working class that had begun in the last years of the Vargas presidency. This development occurred both in the party system and in the sphere of industrial relations. In the newly opened political arena, parties with a base in the working class burst on to the scene with surprising electoral success. In the presidential and congressional elections of December 1945, the Communists won 10 percent of the national vote and pluralities in major industrial cities and a number of state capitals. They also did well in the supplementary elections in January 1947. The PTB fared comparably well, winning another 10 percent of the national vote, so that the two parties based in the union movement together received approximately 20 percent of the vote. This electoral mobilization was accompanied by a more militant political posture on the part of not only the Communists, but also the PTB. As John French has argued, during this period the working class achieved a new level of consciousness which marked a radical break with the past. He suggests that even in this early period, shortly after its founding, the PTB could not be seen simply as an instrument created from above by the Vargas forces. Rather, it came to represent, at least to some extent, an independent working class voice, as competition from the Communist Party put the PTB under pressure to be responsive to the rank and file. 16 This new militancy of the Brazilian working class was also evident within the unions, which underwent a process of democratization and reactivation. A major leadership change took place as PCB and PTB militants came to occupy prominent positions in the unions, which as a consequence began to slip from government control. In 1945 an attempt to institute plural unionism, in order to nip this trend in the bud, failed because of workers' opposition. In 1946 Communist leaders organized a major wave of strikes affecting many rural as well as urban areas.
Mexico also experienced heightened political and class conflict during this period. With the end of the war, the CTM split over the issue of continued collaboration with the government. Dissidents, under Communist influence, saw collaboration as a wartime expedient and were ready to resume a more militant, aggressive posture. Two major splits occurred as a result, the first when a number of national unions left the CTM and formed the rival CUT, and the second somewhat later, when the same conflict led to the expulsion from the CTM of Lombardo, who went on to form the AOCM (which was later replaced by the UGOCM). The two dissident confederations favored a more combative and independent position, and at their height they probably constituted about 40 percent of the organized labor movement. This split was mirrored in the political sphere, when Lombardo founded the PPS as an opposition party based in the working class. In the long run, the PPS did not fare very well, but the split of Lombardo from both the CTM and PRI is consistent with the hypothesis of greater working class combativeness in the immediate postwar period.
The two qualifications to the prediction about growing conflict in the immediate postwar period concern Chile and Venezuela, where political collaboration continued along with a rise in class conflict. Chile thus presents a somewhat mixed picture. Table 2 presents a kind of "score card" for the hypotheses derived from this first perspective focusing on the impact of the international forces on domestic politics in Latin America. It is evident that the hypotheses appear to be substantially supported; few of the predicted outcomes did not occur. At this broad "correlational" level, the general hypothesis about the causal importance of the international conjuncture seems to hold up quite well, and events in Latin America demonstrate substantial fit with the cross-sectional explanation focusing on external causes. Let us turn now to the second perspective.
The Initial Incorporation of Labor as a Critical Juncture
Like the perspective focusing on international forces in the 1940s, the second perspective, concerned with the incorporation of labor, also makes a set of predictions about labor protest, state-labor relations, political coalitions, government reform initiatives, and political openings and closings. Unlike the first perspective, it examines the unfolding of a path-dependent pattern of causation.
According to this perspective, the type of initial incorporation of labor marks a critical juncture that sets countries on a particular trajectory. The argument thus centers around an important transition in the historical evolution of the relations between the state and the working class, specifically, the constellation of domestic political forces at the time when the labor movement was first incorporated as a legitimate social actor and typically given legal recognition. In the course of capitalist industrialization, the growth of the working class gave rise to new issues and new political cleavages, and the initial period of labor incorporation is seen as constituting a critical juncture when new coalitions were formed around these issues and cleavages. This political reorientation left an enduring legacy: it influenced the political affiliation of organized labor, the particular class and sectoral coalitions that emerged, and the party structures that were consolidated. These factors in turn influenced future patterns of political change, affecting whether politics were integrative or polarizing and whether and how party systems came to channel social conflict; they ultimately affected patterns of political legitimacy and stability.
The argument proceeds in terms of three sequential analytic phases: incorporation, aftermath, and heritage. In the first, different types of incorporation experiences are distinguished. It is argued that each type of labor incorporation had particular dynamics or contradictions that were addressed in the following period, the aftermath. These two phases together, the incorporation period and its aftermath, produced a particular political heritage.
Incorporation Period Throughout Latin America the incorporation of labor was undertaken by the state to address what became known as the "social question": how the state should respond to the rising level of workers' protest and the issue of the dismal work conditions and exploitation of the laboring classes. The initial incorporation of labor refers to the historical transition when political leaders first attempted a shift in the relationship between the state and labor, from one in which state control over labor was centrally based on repression, to one in which state control was primarily exercised through the legitimation, usually accompanied by formal legalization, of a state-sanctioned labor movement. The initial incorporation period can thus be defined as a transition in which political leaders used the state to undertake the first sustained attempt to legitimate and shape an institutionalized labor movement. It represents a change in the orientation of state policy from exclusion to incorporation, in which the state established institutionalized channels for resolving labor conflicts in order to supersede the ad hoc use of repression and came to assume a major role in institutionalizing a new system of class bargaining.
The initial incorporation period does not refer to an enduring outcome of a particular pattern of labor incorporation but rather to a critical transition, the specific features of which may or may not have been durable. It is not the case that as a result of the incorporation experience the labor movement was incorporated "once and for all," or that the particular pattern of labor incorporation remained unchanged. Rather, the incorporation period was a transition when political coalitions and structures changed around new political cleavages. The new coalitions may have later undergone internal reordering, but this was a critical time when crucial choices were made about whether or not the labor movement would participate in multiclass political coalitions and become affiliated to new populist parties. It is argued that future patterns of political change can not be understood without reference to these differences in coalitions and party systems.
These initial incorporation experiences emerged out of a major period of economic growth and social change. The rapid expansion of Latin American economies that began in the late nineteenth century led to urbanization and new economic activity in commerce and manufacturing. These new economic sectors spawned two new social groups: a working class and a broad range of middle sector groups, including owners and managers of industrial or commercial concerns, professionals, and a new white collar middle class. These emerging social actors put new items on the political agenda, including the resolution of industrial conflict and the transformation or reform of the oligarchic state demanded by the middle sectors.
The incorporation project did not take place until the oligarchy lost monopolistic control of the state and representatives of the middle sector reformers came to share power. This change represented a transition from a laissez-faire state controlled by the traditional oligarchy to a more activist and interventionist state, more responsive to the urban middle sectors. Even though the oligarchy itself had in some countries put forth an incorporation proposal of its own, no such project was carried out while the oligarchy retained power. Rather, it occurred only as part of a larger transformation in which, while continuing to embody liberal notions of property rights, the state took on expanded social, welfare, and economic responsibilities.
The Labor incorporation contained many common features, yet important differences existed among the countries in the terms of labor incorporation and in the politics that produced it. Everywhere, one goal on the side of the state was to control what was typically seen as a radical and threatening new social force, the working class. But in some cases there was a second goal: the mobilization of labor support. Labor, in turn, had a separate calculation regarding whether or not to seek legal recognition, to accept or participate in the new institutional channels, and to enter political coalitions. The resolution of these different goals and strategies produced different types of incorporation experiences, some of which were more control-oriented and some more mobilizational. Correspondingly, the coalitional position of labor varied.
Though the middle sectors were generally successful in challenging oligarchic hegemony, they had difficulty in establishing their own political dominance and consolidating a more activist, interventionist state. Oligarchic interests remained powerful to varying degrees in the new, "postoligarchic" state. Hence a major issue was the relationship-or cleavage-between the traditional oligarchy and the middle sectors seeking to reform the state. It is in connection with this issue that we may understand the different types of incorporation projects that emerged.
In each of the four cases considered here, political stalemate between the older and newer dominant classes prevented or stymied the adoption of the reform agenda. Two solutions to the deadlock emerged and led to different incorporation projects. In Brazil and Chile, the military played a key role in breaking the political impasse and intervened to oversee the introduction of the new state. In Brazil this occurred in 1937 when, with military support, Vargas abandoned the electoral regime and installed the authoritarian Estado Novo. In Chile this process began in 1924 when army officers, including Carlos Ibianez, intervened in the political arena, and it took a more definitive form in 1927 when Ibanez formally assumed power. In these cases the authoritarian regime coercively maintained a modus vivendi between the traditional oligarchy and the reformist middle sectors. The middle sectors were able to complete the transformation to an activist state, while the material interests of the traditional oligarchy, despite its loss of political control, were largely protected.
In Mexico and Venezuela the traditional oligarchies were relatively weak, and clientelist relations were eroding in their rural societies. Here an alternative strategy to overcome the deadlock was available in the form of labor and peasant mobilization. In Mexico, the stalemate that existed during and after the Revolution (1910-1920) was resolved through government mobilization of popular sector support throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The height of the incorporation period in Mexico was the reformist government of Cardenas (1934-40). In Venezuela, following the death of Gomez in 1935, the government haltingly and indecisively embarked on reforms, but these did not go far enough for the reformist middle sector groups, which remained in opposition. During the decade 1935-45, they mobilized popular support, and in 1945 Accion Democratica, the political party which emerged out of the period of opposition politics, gained power.
The political mobilization of popular sector, and particularly working class, support is the crucial factor that distinguishes the two major types of incorporation experiences, which may be called state incorporation and party incorporation, respectively. In both types of incorporation projects political leaders sought to use the resources of the state to respond to the rise in strikes and class conflict by controlling working class unions and their activities. However, in cases of party incorporation, political leaders sought not only to control labor, but also to win the political support of the working class-and, in Mexico and Venezuela, the peasantry as well-and to mobilize this political support the political party became an important instrument. State and party incorporation are thus distinguished by this difference in the balance between labor control and mobilization, as well as by the role of the political party in the incorporation project. The main characteristics of these two types are outlined in Table 3 .
In the cases of party incorporation, sufficient benefits were offered to induce a major sector of the labor movement to cooperate with the state. In these cases, labor became politically incorporated in a multiclass alliance. In cases of state incorporation, where mobilization of support was not pursued, organized labor retained greater political autonomy, in the specific sense that it was not affiliated to governing multiclass parties, even as it was subjected to the greater constraints of a more control-oriented, corporative labor law. This difference in the political position of labor had important and enduring consequences.
Thus, the two types of incorporation produced quite different political alliances. State incorporation, in Brazil and Chile, was based on an accommodationist alliance consisting of an uneasy truce between the reformers and the oligarchy. The emphasis lay on the depoliticization of the working class and the control of the union movement. In Brazil, a highly elaborated labor law structured the system of trade union representation and provided explicit controls over unions with respect to demand-making (particularly the use of the strike), internal governance, and leadership selection. Independent and leftist unions were The dynamics or logic of support mobilization meant that, compared to state incorporation, party incorporation involved more concessions and a stronger political position for the labor movement. Instead of being repressed, leftist and independent unions were tolerated (though not necessarily favored) or even became part of the governing coalition. A corporative labor code was promulgated, but it imposed fewer constraints on unions and union activity.'9 The same kind of officialist, state-penetrated union movement was not established, even though mobilization induced the labor movement to support the government and, in receiving benefits from it, to become dependent on the state. In general, the adoption of a mobilization strategy entailed an increase in the political power of labor, since its very utility to the political leadership as a political resource depended on labor's strength.
INCORPORATION [---------------Pattern of Incorporation---------------------

-------------------------Dynamics at End of Incorporation--------------------------]
Party incorporation and the political mobilization of labor did not threaten the basic capitalist orientation of the state, but rather did much to coopt the working class. Nevertheless, working class mobilization threatened important sectors of society. As a consequence, the incorporation period was characterized by political polarization, a situation in which a progressive coalition in power was opposed by the dominant economic sectors, which in reaction formed a counterrevolutionary or counterreform alliance. The aftermath began when the authoritarian regimes which oversaw state incorporation became discredited and were terminated through democratic openings. State incorporation, with its emphasis on political demobilization, failed to address the issue of the political participation of the working class, which once again became relevant with the restoration of a more open regime. By the end of the incorporation period, the absence of a populist party meant that "political space" had not been filled in the same way it had in cases of party incorporation: with the attempt to depoliticize labor, institutional channels for workers' political participation had not been established, partisan identifies among workers had not been consolidated, coalitions had not been formed between labor and other classes or political actors, and in relative terms the working class was politically autonomous from governing parties, at the same time that it was highly constrained in the sphere of industrial relations.
Aftermath of Incorporation
The political agenda in the aftermath of state incorporation therefore contained two broad items. Labor had a new opportunity to enter the political arena and participate in partisan politics. The aftermath was characterized by a rapid reactivation and politicization of the labor movement. Middle sector leaders, for their part, sought to fill the void left by state incorporation. They did this through what, from a comparative perspective, might be called a "belated" attempt to establish a populist party in order to mobilize and channel working class political participation and to address the issue of the partisan affiliation of the labor movement, as well as to enlist labor's support and enlarge their coalition. Interestingly, these attempts were made by the original leaders of the middle class reformers. In Brazil, Vargas, at the end of his presidency, took the initiative to set up the PTB, the Brazilian Labor Party, as the vehicle for labor representation and participation. In Chile, Marmaduque Grove, Ibanez's original coconspirator of 1924, and other reformers sought to mobilize working class support, primarily through the populist Socialist Party.
However, this attempt to establish populist parties was not successful. The middle sectors were not united around them but were primarily associated with other centrist or center-right parties that did not have a large working class base of support. As a result, they never came to power and were never in a position to win sufficient concessions to satisfy their labor constituency.
Instead, the aftermath of state incorporation was a period of coalitional politics in which center or center-right parties, the PSD in Brazil and the Radical Party in Chile, came to power on the basis of electoral coalitions with the populist parties (and, in the case of Chile, with the Communist Party as well). However, given the continued influence of the oligarchy and its strength in parliament, the centrist parties were oriented toward an accommodationist coalition with conservative oligarchic groups at least as much as toward a populist coalition with the working class. Therefore, though the populist parties were key components of a winning electoral coalition, they remained junior partners in the subsequent governing coalitions. As such, they were unable to extract enough for their collaboration to satisfy the working class. As a result, an increasingly radicalized, noncollaborationist tendency emerged within the populist parties and within the trade union movements. In both Brazil and Chile, this trend was reinforced by a relatively powerful Communist party that competed for working class loyalty and support (though in Brazil it had to do this from an underground position). Disappointed with coalition politics and influenced by the Communists, the populist parties developed important left-wing factions. A process of polarization began, and the period ended with the abandonment of the now discredited pattern of coalition politics. By 1952 in Chile and by 1960 in Brazil, the labor movement and those parties or tendencies that had attracted working class support abandoned collaboration with the centrist parties. The aftermath periods ended with the collapse and discrediting of populism and center-left coalition politics.
The outcome of state incorporation and its aftermath was thus a failure to create a strong, stable political center. The weakness or instability of the political center is one of the most widely noted features of the party systems of Brazil and Chile. The larger heritage of state incorporation may be labeled multiparty polarizing politics. This is not to say that Brazil and Chile were identical cases. Obviously, Chile had a much stronger civil society, including a stronger labor movement and much stronger political parties; it had a deeper level of politicization; and polarization went much further than in Brazil. Yet, compared to other Latin American countries, these two regimes shared a distinctive dynamic. They had highly fragmented party systems with a built-in tendency toward polarization. Polarization intensified until a broad coalition favoring a coup emerged. In 1964 in Brazil and 1973 in Chile the military intervened and inaugurated the longest periods of bureaucraticauthoritarian rule (twenty-one and seventeen years, respectively) in South America.
In cases of party incorporation, the main feature at the end of the incorporation period was the conservative reaction triggered by the mobilization of labor, the progressive reforms, and the sense of more conservative sectors that they had been cut out of the governing coalition. In Venezuela the conservative reaction culminated in a military coup which deposed the AD government in 1948 and introduced a decade of repressive, counterreformist rule. In Mexico the same polarization and rightist opposition occurred, but the party managed to stay in power, electing in 1940 a more conservative successor to Cardenas. In an effort to later regain power, as in Venezuela, or retain power, as in Mexico, the main item on the agenda of the populist parties was to constitute a new centrist bloc that could bring to an end the political polarization provoked by the populist coalition.
The postincorporation dynamic in Mexico and Venezuela presented a striking contrast to that of Brazil and Chile. In Mexico and Venezuela, the conservative reaction signaled the political limits of reform within the context of a capitalist state, pointing to the need to avoid the kind of polarization that had occurred, to include the bourgeoisie and middle sectors in the dominant political coalition, and to reconstitute a new multiclass coalition, but one more heavily weighted this time to the center-right. This effort to reintegrate the right and create a new governing coalition had four components: a programmatic turn to the right; the exclusion of the left from the alliance; the retention of the labor movement (urban and rural) within the alliance by maintaining union-party linkages and labor support; and the establishment of conflict-limiting mechanisms that would help avoid the polarization that had led to the toppling of the AD regime in 1948 and threatened the dominance of the Mexican party in 1940. In Mexico, the mechanism employed was the strengthening of the one-party-dominant system. In Venezuela, the mechanism was the functional equivalent, the party pact.
The heritage of party incorporation in Mexico and Venezuela was very different from that of state incorporation in Brazil and Chile. It consisted of a party-political system that was integrative rather than polarizing and that institutionalized something approaching a coalition of the whole, rather than unstable coalitions. These regimes contained important conflict-limiting mechanisms that facilitated the formation of consistent policy with some gradual, pendular swings, rather than the accelerating, zero-sum conflict that led to policy vacillation and immobilism and became hallmark features in Brazil and Chile. In addition, Mexico and Venezuela were characterized by the predominance of centrist, multiclass parties that had an important base of support in the working class, rather than by a fragmented, multiparty system that relegated parties with substantial working class support to a position of nearly permanent opposition. The heritage, therefore, was a stable, hegemonic regime that weathered the economic crises and political challenges that confronted Latin American countries throughout the 1960s and 1970s without the extended and repressive military rule of Brazil and Chile.
Combining Perspectives
The discussion above summarizes the argument of two quite different accounts, two different analytic frameworks, two sets of explanations of labor politics and regime change in Latin America in the 1940s. The first sees Latin American politics during the 1940s as outcomes of powerful international factors reflecting the changing relationships among the major world powers. The second focuses on a formative internal transition that in most instances occurred earlier in the century, not in the 1940s. It explains different paths or trajectories of change followed by Latin American countries during periods that do not necessarily coincide and at rates that vary considerably among them. From this point of view, the 1940s is a rather arbitrary decade that catches countries in different phases in the unfolding of their trajectories. How do these two explanatory schemes intersect? How might they be combined or juxtaposed?
One may begin by noting which of the internal phases occur in the 1940s. As is evident from Figure 1 , the decade corresponds to the incorporation and/or aftermath periods in all four countries. During this decade, two countries, one an example of state incorporation and the other of party incorporation, underwent the transition from the incorporation period to its aftermath. In the other two cases, the entire decade corresponds to the aftermath. Figure 2 presents a more detailed chart of the intersection of the two perspectives and the correspondence between the incorporation and aftermath periods, on the one hand, and the four periods hypothesized from the perspective of the international conjuncture of the 1940s, on the other.
In an attempt to link the two perspectives one might ask three questions (see Table 4 ). The first considers the two strands of analysis as rival hypotheses and asks to what extent the international events of the 1940s are really the causes of the outcomes attributed to internal dynamics. It asks, in other words, if the internal logic is spurious. The answer seems to be negative because of the contrasts in timing between the two cases of state incorporation and between the two cases of party incorporation. As Table 4 indicates, within each pair of cases, similar or parallel internal dynamics and steps unfolded in different decades; that is, they did not occur in the same international context. This is true not only of the incorporation and aftermath periods as a whole, but also of the phases or subperiods of each. Because of this difference in timing, it can not be the case that international factors caused events ascribed to the unfolding of an internal political logic. In answer to the first question, then, the impact of the historical conjuncture does not make the internal explanation spurious.
The second question considers the impact of the international factors as complementary to the perspective focusing on internal trajectories. Did the international events of the 1940s affect the timing, intensity, and variation of the outcomes that were part of the internal dynamic? The dates given in Figure 1 show which phases of the internal trajectory fall in the 1940s and might have been affected by international events. Let us consider each of the four cases in turn.
In Brazil there would seem to be little doubt that the end of the incorporation period and the timing of the transition to the aftermath period was affected by the international events of Table 4 International factors obviously had important consequences for Latin America. Yet in terms of particular outcomes the international conjuncture does not seem to constitute a more powerful explanation than the dynamics of the internal trajectory, nor does it render them spurious. In a number of instances the international factors did, however, affect the timing and intensity of the stages following labor incorporation. International factors help to round out the picture and explain some of the variation within patterns of change for which the internal argument does not systematically account.
Finally, the third question raises the issue of how the influence of the internal dynamics may explain the differential impact of international events. As Table 2 showed, sometimes the expected outcomes of the 1940s did not occur, and the deviation can often be explained in light of internal trends. That is, when the two logics contradicted one another and pointed toward different outcomes, the internal dynamic took precedence.
Among the four countries considered, Brazil appeared to follow most closely the periodization suggested by international forces. Yet even in Brazil the deviations can be explained by the internally driven logic. An example is the political opening that occurred at a time when the Cold War might have suggested a political closing. In 1950 a reformist opening began that could only be understood as an integral part of the aftermath of state incorporation-as part of the attempt to establish acceptable channels for the political participation of labor.
Mexico likewise generally conformed to the phases suggested by the international conjuncture of the 1940s, but with one exception: the period of political opening and reform in 1944-46 did not occur. Instead, as we have seen, this was a period when Mexico was moving in the opposite direction, toward political closing, the strengthening of one party dominance, and the marginalization of labor. This exception is quite easily explained by the internal dynamics. These years corresponded to the aftermath of party incorporation and hence constituted a period of conservative reaction to the prior reformist period. In this case, the logics of the two perspectives are contradictory-the international conjuncture points to a period of reformism while the internal trajectory points to a period of antireformism-and of the two, the latter was more important in shaping politics in Mexico.
In Chile international influences became most visible in the relationship between the policy of the Comintern and the formation of the Chilean Popular Front in the mid 1930s and in the subsequent coalitions among the Communist, Socialist, and Radical parties in the 1940s. Though the formation of the Popular Front can not be understood without reference to international factors, these factors seem insufficient in explaining the persistence of these coalitions during the 1940s. Contrary to what would have been predicted, the Chilean Popular Front survived the German-Soviet pact, and similar coalitions were reestablished for some time beyond the end of World War II, when international factors pointed to increased class conflict and protest. A wave of labor actions did occur after 1945, yet in some ways the shift to the politics of confrontation was limited, despite strong ties between a relatively strong, class-conscious labor movement and Marxist parties that might have suggested particular receptivity to the influence of international communism. In 1946, when Communist parties elsewhere in the region were returning to a confrontational posture, the Chilean party not only once again joined the governing coalition, but for the first time formally joined and participated in the government, something it had declined to do during the years of the Comintern's popular front policy. The various deviations from the expected patterns of the 1940s reflected the playing out of the attempts at coalition politics typical of the aftermath of state incorporation. At the end of World War II the possibilities and drawbacks of collaboration were still being explored, the issues remained unresolved, and all parties continued to vacillate. In prior years, both the Communist and Socialist parties had withdrawn and reentered coalitions with the Radicals; the Radical party for its part had alternatively approached and distanced itself from the left and labor. It might be suggested, then, that although this type of center-left coalitional politics would ultimately be discredited, the final throes of this coalitional phase were still approaching by the end of the war, and the pattern continued, despite the international conjuncture of renewed political confrontation.
Venezuela, too, generally conforms to the periods predicted by the 1940s perspective, with one main variation. In line with the hypothesized effects, labor protest increased dramatically in the immediate postwar years. However, the "correlational" fit with the hypothesis must be supplemented with more contextual analysis. The heightened protest was less a result of the end of popular front collaboration on the part of the Communist-influenced labor movement than a reflection of the new activism of AD unions, undertaken with the support of the Trienio government. This outcome must be understood in terms of the pattern of party incorporation and the mobilization of labor support that characterized it.
Conclusion
It has become commonplace to acknowledge faddism in the social sciences. Yet, like the English weather, despite all the talk nobody actually does anything about it. In this analysis I have tried to look jointly at two explanatory perspectives. Perhaps this kind of exercise can provide an example of how one might proceed, so that instead of moving lock, stock, and barrel from one perspective or analytic framework to another, from today's favored explanatory approach to tomorrow's, we might try to preserve the insights of earlier perspectives as we move toward new ones by explicitly combining perspectives. Such an exercise is an important step toward more cumulative understandings.
That said, it should be immediately acknowledged that, when one is working with historical data and case study methods. it is difficult to sort out explanations when they are juxtaposed in this way. It is not as if one can use a partial correlation to assess if the "real" cause is one variable or another or do a regression analysis to evaluate how much each factor contributes to the explanation. What is required is a much more difficult and painstaking kind of contextual analysis and teasing out of complex explanations.
This analysis has attempted to juxtapose two different analytic perspectives as they relate to labor politics and regime change in Latin America during the 1940s. Both the international and the internal perspectives contribute to our understanding; hence they should
